Starting from the summer of 2008, the European Union's economy suffers the recession. The discontent of EU citizens does not allow to implement impartial (although sometimes painful) actions for the recovery of the situation which lasts too long
Introduction
The problem of macroeconomic stability of state's economy 1 practically seems to be extremely important problem during the centuries. Starting from the date when the letter was invented in Mesopotamia in 3100 BC people started to look for possibilities how to control the flows of assets in different forms, how to save the jewels, how to 1 The author maintains the idea presented by many of scientists and practicians of fiscal watchdog creation.
manage the effective collection of tribute, to enforce people to work etc. (Kancerevyčius, G., 2009) . History highlights plenty of events which could be interpreted as precondition for the need to create well organised systems (with different elements) which would enable to function state's economy properly and effectively. Such intentions are nothing less then challenge for theorists and practitioners to find a method for the construction of a perfect system 2 of maintenance of macroeconomic stability domestically.
When analysing the decline of the EU's economic, financial as well as social situation, which started in the autumn of 2008 (the light of World's financial crisis), some controversial conclusions follow. As the practice shows, unless the vital need for the perfect management of different economic as well as fiscal and monetary policy activities and plenty of scientific efforts, were the importance and possibility to control macroeconomic situation is analysed (e. g. Keynes J. M., 1930; 1936; Hayek F. A. (1944) 3 ; Friedman M. (1976); Schumpeter J. (1947) 4 ; Samuelson P. (1946) ; Sollow, R. (1956) ; Rothschild, M., Stiglitz, J. (1976) ; Barro R., Becker G. (1980) ; Hawkins, 1948; Clarida, R., Gali, J., Gertler M., 2000; Kaminsky, Reinhart, 1999; Fehr, E., Schmidt, K. M. (1999) ; Bauer, Herz, Karb, 2007; OECD, 2009; Freedman C., 2000; Meyer, L. H., Doyle, B. M., Gagnon, J. E., Henderson, D. W., 2002; Barrell, R., Davis, E. Ph., 2005; Clarida, R., Gali, J., Gertler, M. (2000) ; Bresnahan, T. F., Erik Brynjolfsson, E., Hitt, L. M. (2002) , Barrell, R., Hurst. I, (2008) ; Martinez, V., Sancher-Robles, B. (2009); etc.) , there are many insufficient attempts to control economic situation in the EU. Rhetorical question -where is a problem? It is a key to stress that one of the essential preconditions for the problems in the EU is not only the political ambitions but and the lack of productive communication (dialog) between practitioners (in the case of state's leaders) and scientists. There are many historical lessons from the past (Minsky, H.P., 1992; Daugėlienė, R., 2011) as well as methods, e. g. signalto-noise ratio used in Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) or the profit modelling in Frankel and Rose (1996) which allow to predict the possible events as well as to design guidelines for the solution of consequences. However such practise is still missing.
Considering the above mentioned, the article solves the scientific problem -how to evaluate the macroeconomic situation of a national economy? What are the main indicators for macroeconomic stability surveillance of the national economy? Is it possible to apply it to every country? Are there any correlations between theoretical instruments (policies) for coordination of macroeconomic situation at the domestic level and actual actions undertaken by the EU Commission?
The object of research is the domestic (EU member state's) macroeconomic stability and EU-actions for the maintenance of macroeconomic and financial stability.
The subject of the research is a set of theoretical indicators used for the macroeconomic stability surveillance.
The aim of the article -to construct hypothetical evolvent of macroeconomic stability surveillance indicators and to analyse some initiatives of EU Commission for the maintenance of macroeconomic and financial stability.
To achieve this aim four tasks are to be performed:
• to systemise existing theoretical instruments (policies) for coordination of macroeconomic situation in the state level;
2 The statement is more hypothetical. However there is possibility to create perfect model in the theory which could be converted or applied in the practise. 3 Hayek F. A. The Road to Serfdom (1944) . Routledge Press.
4 "Theoretical Problems of Economic Growth", 1947.
• to construct the evolvent of macroeconomic stability surveillance indicators; • to highlight some initiatives of the EU Commission for the maintenance of macroeconomic and financial stability; • to provide negotiable recommendations for actions considering macroeconomic and financial stability surveillance in the EU.
Scientific originality and practical significance of the article:
• the article solves original scientific problem: is there the applicable method for evaluation of macroeconomic stability of a national economy ; • solution of the scientific problem will enable to provide the comprehensive evolvent of macroeconomic stability surveillance indicators; • there are provided practical and substantiated recommendations for actions considering macroeconomic and financial stability surveillance in the EU. Theoretical comparative analysis of the scientific works, analysis of legal documents as well as strategies and practical papers in this field was taken as the research methods. The recommendations and conclusions are provided using reality -based, prognostic -analytical methods.
Existing Theoretical Instruments (Policies) for Coordination of Macroeconomic Situation in the State Level
P. Samuelson together with other American economists in the period of 1940 -1950 created positivistic neoclassical economic theory. It declares that functional relations between macroeconomic indicators are based on microeconomic processes and events. The later were analysed by neoclassic economists Menger C., Jevons W. S., Bohm -Bawerk E., Walras L. and U. Marshal. In 1946, P. Samuelson stated that modern economic system can effectively overcome such defects of life as unemployment and inflation. It could be achieved by adjusting two principles: effective influence of government on the market as a unique system and; freedom of behaviour of producer and consumer.
In the 1970's new classical economists Lucas R., Sargent Th. J., Barro R. criticised J. M. Keynes ideas considering wages and prices adjustments. New classical economists build their macroeconomic theories on the assumption that wages and prices are flexible. Some of the scientists analyse the coordination failure in macroeconomic 5 (Cooper, R., John A., 1988; Gaygısız, E., Madden P., 2002; Irons J. S., 2005) . According to this, the question rises: are there any scientifically based instruments (policies) for the assurance of state's macroeconomic stability? The analysis of scientific works shows that these instruments do exist but not all of them can be applied without adaptation to the reality and depth of the economic and financial problem.
A. Smith's theory where is stated that the best solution for avoidance of economic recessions is total liberalization of activities of economic unities. That means that governments shouldn't control economic processes organizing liberal, open 113 -free, out of control governmental policy. The later situation in the EU countries) shows that such kind of governmental retreat of disability of political actions is not beneficial for national economies.
It is a key to stress, that theoretically the aims of economic policy could be reached controlling and coordinating seven main instruments (policies) (historically proved), which are identified as essential for the macroeconomic stability maintenance:
• for the creation of economically and socially friendly environment). In order to achieve total benefit all these policies should be coordinated and well organised in each country. Specific institutions should be created in order to ensure efficient implementation of new ideas. The coordination processes directly depends on:
• the purpose and its importance for the national economy; • the effectiveness of each instrument;
• the subjects responsible for the implementation of selected methods. Coordination of policies listed above is imperative but it could be stressed that there are arguments "for" and "against" their application. Calmfors L. (2001) analyzed that there exist the spillover effects of policies. It is very difficult to evaluate the consequences of policies coordination as the possibility to make experiments with different policies is available. Usually these experiments do not conclude positively 7 . Adequate method for macroeconomic policy coordination should be selected taking into account the structure of country (social, economic and cultural -values situation).
Meyer, L. H., Doyle, B. M., Gagnon, J. E., Henderson, D. W. in their 2002 study presented that international macroeconomic coordination is still alive in the new millennium and this process should be developed taking into account the specificity of period and economy. The authors stress, that international policy coordination raises welfare for all states. Accordingly, each country is concerned only with its own welfare. However, policy actions of each country affect the welfare of others. That is, they generate "externalities." Externalities give rise to policy conflicts.
Each country policy coordination could be implemented using a canonical example (incentive to tighten monetary policy in order to lower inflation and raise welfare applying "prisoner's dilemma" game (Meyer, L. H., Doyle, B. M., Gagnon, J. E., Henderson, D. W., 2002) . It is a key to stress that there may raise two types of policy conflicts (absolutely natural and necessary for evaluation):
• stabilization conflicts: temporary conflicts, which occur because of wage and price inertia and eventually disappear as wages and prices adjust; • ongoing conflicts: permanent conflicts, which occur even if wages and prices are perfectly flexible and never disappear. Calmfors L. and Wren-Lewis S. (2011) proposed a method to counter deficit bias of fiscal policy. It is fiscal watchdogs, so-called fiscal or advisory, decision-making councils (for example, International Monetary Fund (IMF); the OECD, the ECB). Advisory councils should solve different causes of deficit bias:
• information and forecasting problems;
• impatience, electoral competition or time inconsistency;
• common -pool problems (the co-ordination necessary to make individual agents internalize the effects of policies that benefit them on others). • ex-post evaluation of whether fiscal policy has met its targets in the past.
• ex-ante evaluation of whether fiscal policy is likely to meet its targets in the future.
• analysis of the long-run sustainability and optimality of fiscal policy.
• analysis of fiscal transparency. Quantitative analysis of policy coordination. There is an extensive literature on the quantitative analysis of policy coordination (Clarida R., Gali, J., Gertler, M., 2002; Mendoza, E. G., Tesar. L. L., 2003; etc.) . Oudiz G. and Sachs J. (1984) were the first to estimate the gains of macroeconomic coordination from cooperation. They used the reduced forms of two econometric models and (quadratic) country welfare functions. The target variables were the output gap, inflation, current account surplus, relative weights. The authors find gains of between one-half and one percent of GDP per year for each of the country blocs considered. . This thesis makes the conclusion that creation of hypothetical simplified structure of indicators for macroeconomic stability surveillance is substantiated and could be applied practically.
Macroeconomic stability surveillance indicators
It is a key to stress that macroeconomic stability of economy firstly depends on three comprehensive elements:
• state's reputation-building;
• formal national rules;
• international monitoring. Figure 1 represents the hypothetical evolvent of macroeconomic stability surveillance indicators.
The main macroeconomic stability surveillance indicators groups are: 1) economic indicators (current account balance; net external position / debt; real effective exchange rate based on unit labour costs; real house price increase; public sector dept; ration of private sector debt / credit to GDP; 2) institutional indicators (independent data collection; 8 Paradoxically, but once more starting from John M. Keynes (1883 Keynes ( -1946 who described macroeconomics as separate element of economic theory in 1936's work "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money". transparent procedures and indicators; integration into existing economic policy surveillance processes; possibilities for discretionary sanctions; 3) individual countries threshold values (culture;
common human values; attitudes; formal national rules; state's reputation). These indicators are strongly affected by global economic activities as well as international political events. The later should be analyzed in order adequate react to the situation.
It is a key to stress that the assessment of existing situation of macroeconomic situation of every state or region should be coordinated with specific actions for the solution of problems detected. There close cooperation of scientists and policymakers should be organized in order to enforce the solution of problems. The identification -is just the beginning of long process of economy recovery.
Some Initiatives of the EU Commission for the Maintenance of Macroeconomic and Financial Stability 9
After the September 2008 EU policy actions were addressed in order to make monetary policy much easier: zero rate interest bound was presented; a wave of debt guarantees, recapitalisation and impaired asset relief was implemented at record speed to avoid insolvency of financial institutions and meltdown of the financial system at large 10 .
In the wake of the financial crisis the European Council at its meeting of 11-12 December 2008 approved the European 9 The article does not aim to present all the EU's initiatives towards stable economy maintenance. It is a key to highlight that they do exist but the economic situation in the EU is still very complicated. 10 Detailed concise calendar of the EU policy actions (period 2008 October -2009 July), p. 57. On-line document: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ publications/publication15887_en.pdf Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), setting out how Member States and the European Union can coordinate their policies and provide new stimulus to the European economy. Quite controversial and discussible seems the first attempts to strengthen EU economy. An important part of the EERP was the proposal to increase Community investment in defined strategic sectors and in particular in infrastructure projects, with the objectives of giving an immediate boost to the economy and at the same time enhancing Europe's longerterm sustainable growth potential. In particular, the Plan included a €500 million call for proposals for Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) projects. Were these actions adequate for the situation? Why the actions were not attacked to the financial problems of countries? European Economic Recovery Plan -Financing part (2009) was absolutely not oriented to the solution of essential macroeconomic problems.
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In 2009 European Commission presented crisis policy framework where crisis prevention, control and mitigation, resolution and EU coordination frameworks were highlighted in the light of financial, monetary, fiscal, structural policies. There were provided EU coordinated tools for micro-and macro-prudential surveillance as well as fiscal surveillance. However the economic imbalance in the euro zone and entire EU internal market still remains essential problem which needs for determined concrete EU's actions.
Communication "Driving European recovery" of 4 March 2009, the European Commission committed itself to come forward with proposals for reform of the EU framework for financial supervision. The problems and problem drivers as well as objectives in micro and macro prudential supervision were highlighted (EC, 2009) .
Initiatives undertaken by the EC in 2009 (apart from the work on financial supervision) were:
• improving and removing gaps in regulation concerning alternative investment funds and capital requirements for banks; • protecting consumers and SMEs (initiatives to foster responsible lending and borrowing); • improving incentives to reduce excessive short-term risk-taking (initiatives on remuneration in financial services); • strengthening sanctions for infringements of the rules. In a line with mentioned initiatives the EC ensured that appropriate crisis intervention tools would be available in all Member States to allow early intervention in ailing banks or insurance firms, in order to guarantee the continuity of key financial services, whilst minimising costs to the taxpayer. Specific regulatory issues related to large and complex financial groups were addressed in the context of the review of the Financial Conglomerates Directive (FCD) as well (EC, 2009) .
European Economic Recovery Plan 2010-2013 was signed in 2009 as well. The Commission and the industrial partners undertook to work intensively together to develop the implementation plans for the three partnerships: "Factories of the Future" initiative for the manufacturing sector (€1.2 billion for R&D); "Energy-efficient Buildings" initiative for 11 European Economic Recovery Plan -Financing, 2009 On-line: http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/107374. pdf the construction sector (€1 billion for R&D); and "Green Cars" initiative for the automotive sector worth a total of €5 billion, of which €1 billion is for research activities.
Europe 2020 (March 2010) -the EC proposed platform for a new growth initiative where five ambitious objectives on employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy should be reached by 2020. Four priorities (smart growth; sustainable growth; inclusive growth; economic governance) were settled down 12 . Europe 2020 declares that assurance of public finances quality as well as sustainable development is essential and should be controlled not only at the state's level. It should be one of the political priorities of all EU. The macroeconomic imbalance -the phenomenon which destroys the basics of EU countries and euro zone countries economies -need to be controlled by approved (historically and practically) methods, instruments or models. It is important to evaluate that all control measures have to be selected considering the state's situation (this means, that different measures should be applied for Germany, Sweden, France, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and other for Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy).
The EC also proposed and the EU co-legislators agreed a "six-pack" of legislation on economic governance, which entered into force on 13 December 2011. This new legislation has given the EU new and effective tools to deepen monitoring of Member States' economic and fiscal policies and to enforce the rules. Through it, the Stability and Growth Pact was amended to strengthen collective surveillance of public finances.
Stability and Growth Pact 13 (SGP) (is a rule-based framework for the coordination of national fiscal policies in the economic and monetary union (EMU). The last reform was made in 2011 following the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, the EU member states adopted a new reform under the Open Method of Coordination, aiming at straightening the rules e.g. by adopting an automatic procedure for imposing of penalties in case of breaches of either the deficit or the debt rules. The new "Euro Plus Pact" was designed as a more stringent successor to the Stability and Growth Pact, which has not been implemented consistently. The measures are controversial not only because of the closed way in which it was developed but also for the goals that it postulates. SGP cover stability and Convergence programmes (or updates) and National Reform Programmes.
It can be agreed completely with the statement of Calmfors L. and Wren-Lewis S. (2011) that "at the EU level, the stability pact imposed ceilings on deficits and debt as well as mediumterm budget objectives. Just several countries introduced 12 It is a key to stress that Europe 2020 is strategic document, very similar to the Lisbon Strategy 2010 which was not completely achieved. This presuppose the doubts if the Europe 2020 will work? 13 Agreement, among the 27 Member states of the EU, to facilitate and maintain the stability of the EMU. Based primarily on Articles 121 and 126 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it consists of fiscal monitoring of members by the EC and the Council of Ministers and, after multiple warnings, sanctions against offending members. First was adopted in 1997 so that fiscal discipline would be maintained and enforced in the EMU. Member states adopting the euro have to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria, and the SGP ensures that they continue to observe them. SGP was reformed twice: in 2005 the EU Council, under the pressure of France and Germany, relaxed the rules. the EC said it was to respond to criticisms of insufficient flexibility and to make the pact more enforceable; and in 2011.
116 national fiscal rules. The recent explosion in government debt suggests that the rules approach was not sufficient. One reason is that rules were not observed (Greece). Another is that, when deficit ceilings were respected, fiscal outcomes lay so close to them that there".
23 Member States (all Euro area Member States as well as Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) agreed the Euro Plus Pact in March 2011 to step up coordination of reforms in areas not fully covered at EU level. These countries have committed themselves to far-reaching reforms in the four areas covered by the Pact:
• fostering competitiveness;
• fostering employment;
• enhancing the sustainability of public finances and reinforcing financial stability. They are also committed to engage in structured discussions on tax policy issues. The commitments of the participating Member States are reflected in their Stability or Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes.
EU Regulation on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances
14 . There was stated that coordination of the economic policies of the member states should be developed in the context of the broad economic policy guidelines and the employment guidelines, and should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sustainable public finances and monetary conditions and sustainable balance of payments. There is a need to learn lessons from the first decade of functioning of the EMU and, in particular, for improved economic governance in the Union built on stronger national ownership. The regulation provided and strengthened the EP and EC competence considering macroeconomic imbalance regulation, establishment of alert mechanism for the early detection of emerging macroeconomic imbalances. All member states are required to implement actions to address macroeconomic imbalances and divergences in competitiveness. The nature, importance and urgency of the policy challenges may differ significantly depending on the member states concerned. It is important to make economic adjustment capacity.
Financial rules which were settled down in the SGP were two week in order to manage the collapse of EU's financial market. Considering that EC's work group suggested new supervisory system. In 2011 January new EP and Council of Ministers regulation 1093/2010 took into force. According to this, three European Financial Supervision institutions were established:
• Growth and Jobs (2012) .
As it is stressed by EC (2012) it was made important progress in reinforcing financial backstops. The European Stability Mechanism is scheduled to come into effect on 1 July 2012 -one year ahead of schedule -as the permanent mechanism for financing crisis management in the euro area. Taking the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Mechanism and other crisis funding together EU have a total lending capacity of €800 billion.
Some actions will be addressed tapping into the potential:
• of the Internal Market;
• of Human Capital;
• of External sources of growth;
• of EU funding of the growth that Europe needs. EC indicated that in 2012 efforts at national and at EU level should concentrate on five priorities:
• pursuing differentiated growth-friendly fiscal consolidation;
• restoring normal lending to the economy; • promoting growth and competitiveness for today and tomorrow; • tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis; • modernising public administration. Recognising the importance of forcefully tackling macroeconomic imbalances of a non-fiscal nature, the surveillance framework was also broadened through a new macroeconomic imbalance procedure. It aims to prevent the emergence of imbalances that pose a risk to economic stability. The new procedure includes a sanctions regime for repeated noncompliance with agreed actions. Using this new procedure, the EC first alert mechanism report was published in February 2012. The first in-depth reviews were conducted on twelve countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom).
To deliver collectively on these objectives and bring together all of these commitments, to ensure better ex-ante co-ordination and follow-up of decisions, the Member States agreed and implemented for the first time in 2011 a new way to coordinate national policies, the European semester of policy coordination. The cycle starts with the publication 117 of an Annual Growth Survey (AGS) by the EC, reviewing economic challenges and setting out priorities for the EU as a whole (EC, 2012) .
First, after the 2009, the European Commission turned to the single person declaring that "many of our citizens are angry and bewildered by the speed at which a long period of rising living standards has turned into a huge financial crisis, heavy job losses and the prospect of high debt levels for many years to come". This had to be understood from the very beginning of recession. It is reasoned and theoretically proved true, that the macroeconomic stability of depends upon its ability to react to shocks. Institutions need to be designed to absorb shocks in order to enhance performance. As it is stressed in recent work of Barrell and Davis (2005) , shocks produce cycles. Considering that, control both the impact of shocks and the response of the economy to the shock are important issues for policymakers. Macroeconomic policy in Europe is now oriented to creating a stable environment in which the potential for output growth is enhanced. However, not all dimensions of a stability-oriented policy framework appear to be in place. Fiscal policy rules and arrangements have been the most discussed but they may not be as important as their prominence indicates.
Despite all EC initiatives made for better living and economic growth, full implications for macroeconomic stability, especially in terms of its implications for financial markets, have not yet been fully appreciated by policymakers.
In order to ensure appropriate international macroeconomic coordination the specific actions should be taken:
• it is essential to manage the stabilization conflicts. Usually they arise because of countries exogenous shocks: symmetric shocks, (perfectly) asymmetric shocks, and country-specific. According to Meyer, L. H., Doyle, B. M., etc. (2002) , symmetric shocks affect each of the two countries in exactly the same way; asymmetric shocks affect each of the two countries in equal and opposite ways; a country-specific shock 17 Taking into account all existing EU-actions considering macroeconomic stability surveillance of EU economy, these recommendations without identification of concrete procedural actions should not be interpreted as real for implementation. The scientists are invalid practically solve existing problems despite the fact that there are competent in emphasis of them. This is a question of collaboration of scientists and politicians.
affects one country and not the other; • it is necessary to implement commitments and cooperation's which would provide the rules of actions as well as penalties for offences. Cooperation involves commitments by two or more countries to follow efficient policies. Commitment is possible when there is a supranational authority that can punish departures from announced policies so severely that departures are unthinkable
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. As Meyer, L. H., Doyle, B. M., etc. (2002) state, the threat of punishment causes each country to choose the efficient policy even though each country has an incentive to choose a policy other than its efficient policy if the other chooses its efficient policy. Even if commitment is not possible, the fact that countries will face the same or a similar problem in the future may be enough to make it possible to achieve efficient outcomes;
• 
